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Abstract
Are temporal locations of harms and benefits important to human existence? Conventional wisdom
unambiguously suggests so, albeit interpretations of various dogmatic texts and beliefs. Discussions about
pain, grief, and suffering are commonly favored within past temporal settings, unlike those of happiness,
comfort, and wellbeing that permeate conversations with future temporal locales. Past pain is preferred to
future pain, even when this choice includes more total pain (Callender, 2011). Should these positive and
negative qualifiers that constitute conscious existence have privileged temporal locations? This ethical
question, like many others surrounding temporality, inherits both theoretical and pragmatic inquiries -
becoming indispensable within moral and juridical dispositions. The concept of temporal neutrality, which
posits that agents should not attach normative significance to temporal locations of benefits and harms, all else
being equal, is central to the present philosophical investigation.
In his Prospects for Moral Neutrality chapter of The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time (2011), David
O. Brink articulates what exactly temporal neutrality requires and why we ought to care about its precepts. As
they are assessed by how they distribute benefits and harms across people’s lives through interpersonal
distributive justice, actions and policies can also be assessed by their distribution of benefits and harms across
time. This concept of intertemporal distribution is a normative demand of temporal neutrality, and according
to some philosophers it makes temporal neutrality an essential part of rationality (Brink, 2011). However,
establishing an impartial foundation for temporal neutrality often appears controversial and counterintuitive.
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              Are temporal locations of harms and benefits important 
to human existence? Conventional wisdom unambiguously 
suggests so, albeit interpretations of various dogmatic texts and 
beliefs. Discussions about pain, grief, and suffering are 
commonly favored within past temporal settings, unlike those of 
happiness, comfort, and wellbeing that permeate conversations 
with future temporal locales. Past pain is preferred to future pain, 
even when this choice includes more total pain (Callender, 
2011). Should these positive and negative qualifiers that 
constitute conscious existence have privileged temporal 
locations? This ethical question, like many others surrounding 
temporality, inherits both theoretical and pragmatic inquiries - 
becoming indispensable within moral and juridical dispositions. 
The concept of temporal neutrality, which posits that agents 
should not attach normative significance to temporal locations of 
benefits and harms, all else being equal, is central to the present 
philosophical investigation.  
              In his Prospects for Moral Neutrality chapter of The 
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time (2011), David O. Brink 
articulates what exactly temporal neutrality requires and why we 
ought to care about its precepts. As they are assessed by how 
they  distribute  benefits  and  harms  across  people’s  lives  through  
1
Ilic: Time, Ethics and Experience




interpersonal distributive justice, actions and policies can also be 
assessed by their distribution of benefits and harms across time. 
This concept of intertemporal distribution is a normative demand 
of temporal neutrality, and according to some philosophers it 
makes temporal neutrality an essential part of rationality (Brink, 
2011). However, establishing an impartial foundation for 
temporal neutrality often appears controversial and 
counterintuitive.  
Prudence and Temporal Neutrality 
              Temporal neutrality is reflected in the demands of 
prudence: the ability to govern and discipline oneself by the use 
of reason (Meriam-Webster, 2014). Prudence requires agents to 
promote  their  own  “good”  throughout  their  lives.  But  the  “good”  
can, and arguably should, be promoted to all parts of the lives of 
others too. Brink (2011) implies that, while prudence requires 
temporal neutrality, temporal neutrality is not limited to 
prudence. Reflecting on Scottish moral philosopher Adam 
Smith’s  claims  surrounding   temporal  neutrality,  as  explained   in  
his seminal work The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790), Brink 
(2011) affirms that temporal neutrality does not need to be 
confined to prudential concern   with   one’s   own   wellbeing,   but  
can extend to concern for the wellbeing of others. Temporal bias 
spurred   by   an   agent’s   disproportional   ascription   of   normative  
significance to the short-term, while discounting long-term 
harms and benefits, is often thought to be the reason for various 
moral failings (Brink, 2011).  
              Following in the steps of Adam Smith, British utilitarian 
philosopher and economist, Henry Sidgwick, in his The Methods 
of Ethics (1907), further qualifies normative aspects of temporal 
neutrality  as  a  response  to  British  philosopher  Jeremy  Bentham’s  
normative inclination to temporal proximities of pleasures and 
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pain,   calling   it   “the most prominent element in the notion of 
rational”   (Brink,   2011,   p.   355).   Sidgwick   elaborates   on the 
aspects of temporal neutrality and prudence, first by recognizing 
that   prudence’s   temporal   neutrality   is   constrained   about   the  
distribution of harms and benefits over time within a single life, 
and is impartial about the content of the good. And since there 
are different conceptions of the good as in preference-
satisfaction   terms,   like  Sidgwick’s  hedonism,  he   concludes   that  
what  is  indeed  good  is  conditioned  upon  an  agent’s  character  and  
psychological states (Brink, 2011). Sidgwick also acknowledges 
that temporal neutrality is not limited to neither his hedonistic 
prudence, nor prudence in the commonly understood sense. 
Since prudence is intrinsically concerned with the magnitude of 
benefits, but not their temporal location, temporal location can 
inherit significance when correlated with factors affecting the 
magnitude of harms and benefits. In this sense, temporal 
neutrality seems to justify temporal bias, precisely because the 
same resources yield goods of different magnitudes for both 
present and future (Brink, 2011).  
              Sidgwick further explicates this point by drawing 
distinctions between objective and subjective reasons and 
rationality. Assertions of objective rationality stipulate what an 
agent has reason to do under the circumstances, whether or not 
an agent is aware of these facts or in a position to recognize the 
reasons they support. Conversely, assertions of subjective 
rationality stipulate what an agent has reason to do, given their 
beliefs under the circumstances. It is this dichotomy that gives 
rise to possible situations where objectively rational actions can 
be subjectively irrational and vice versa. This situation compels 
us to think of prudence purely in terms of an objective reason. 
Objective reasons are central to the retrospective evaluations of 
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one’s   conduct,   and   subsequent   adjustment   to   one’s  
conceptualization and behavior stemming from prior successes 
and failures. Objective reasons have what Brink (2011) calls 
“explanatory   and   theoretical   primacy”   in   discussions   about  
practical reason (p. 357).  
              Prudence defined along these lines consents dissimilar 
treatment  of  different  temporal  locations  in  an  agent’s  life.  Brink  
(2011), alongside David J. Velleman, argues that it is possible to 
hold a version of this view that treats lives within certain 
narrative structures as more valuable, all else being equal, than 
other lives; this might be particularly true of lives whose upward 
trajectory is defined by preceding harms endured to facilitate 
future benefits, over those lives in which benefits came first, all 
else being equal. This seemingly unequal treatment of temporal 
locations is justified by an equal concern for   all   parts   of   one’s  
life and is, in fact, required by temporal neutrality if, and only if, 
temporal distribution of harms and benefits within a life actually 
contributes to the total value of that life; temporal locations hold 
no independent significance. Brink (2011) simplifies this concept 
as now-for-later sacrifice. He further argues that intrapersonal 
conflicts of value, in which what one does affects both the 
magnitude   of   benefits   and   harms   in   one’s   life,   as  well   as   their  
temporal ordering, are expected and do not compromise the 
concept of temporal neutrality.  
              While Sidgwick supports this notion of temporal 
neutrality as a central aspect of our concept of rationality, Brink 
(2011) contends that Sidgwick does so out of his sympathy for 
hedonism; if all this principle does is limit its application to 
intrapersonal conflicts where temporal location is the only 
variable,  the  principle  is  overly  restrictive.  Sidgwick’s  hedonism,  
as a monistic theory of good, permits us to make assumptions 
4




VOLUME III x 2015 
and restrict the application of temporal neutrality only to 
homogenous goods. Brink (2011) disagrees with this line of 
reasoning, and suggests that this problem is best avoided if we 
allow temporal neutrality to apply to conflicts with multiple 
variables, insisting only that it prohibits assigning value to 
temporal location insofar as this affects the value of the whole. 
This would open up avenues for the application of temporal 
neutrality to heterogeneous conflicts recognizable by the 
pluralistic theories of good (Brink, 2011).  
Compensation and the Rationale for Temporal Neutrality 
           Brink (2011) asks, is there a rationale for temporal 
neutrality? This question becomes important considering that 
temporal neutrality requires sacrifice that can be justified by the 
demand. Now-for-later sacrifice is a perfect example that 
provides us with an answer: compensation. Since prudence is 
temporally neutral, utilitarianism as a theory of normative ethics, 
which holds that actions are right if they are useful or for the 
benefit of a majority, is person-neutral. Since temporal neutrality 
requires intrapersonal balancing, person-neutrality requires 
interpersonal balancing; benefits to some ought to be balanced 
against harms to others, if needed, in order to produce optimal 
interpersonal outcome overall (Brink, 2011). 
              American philosopher John Rawls in his A Theory of 
Justice (1971)   accepts   prudence’s   intrapersonal   balancing,   but  
points  out  how  utilitarianism’s  interpersonal  balancing  is  highly  
problematic,  for  it  “…conflates  all  persons  into  one…  and  does  
not  take  distinction  between  persons  seriously”  (Rawls, 1971, p. 
27-28). In other words, balancing of benefits and harms is 
acceptable within a life, but not across lives. Brink (2011) 
explains this point as follows: in the intrapersonal case, 
benefactor and beneficiary are the same person and 
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compensation happens automatically; in the interpersonal case, 
benefactor and beneficiary are different people and unless the 
beneficiary  somehow  reciprocates,  the  benefactor’s  sacrifice  will  
not be compensated. The critics of utilitarianism find this 
approach unacceptable; there ought to be independent principles 
of interpersonal distribution for each agent individually.  
Rationalizing the Hybrid Structure of Prudence 
              The hybrid structure of prudence comes from being both 
temporally neutral and agent relative, and as such can be 
contrasted against two non-hybrid theories; neutralism, which 
holds that an agent has reason to do something just insofar as it 
is valuable, regardless of temporal locations and who the 
beneficiaries are; and presentism, a completely relative 
normative   theory   regarding   an   agent’s   reasons   for   action   being  
grounded in his or her present interests. Since time and person 
are parallel distributional dimensions, it must be decided where 
to locate harms and benefits in time and among persons. 
However, when this particular perspective is adopted, prudence 
becomes somewhat of an unstable hybrid since it stipulates to 
whom a benefit or harm falls, but not when (Brink 2011, p. 361).  
              British philosopher Derek Parfit, in his Reason and 
Persons (1984), also voices concern about the hybrid structure of 
prudence, which he calls a self-interest theory (S): 
As a hybrid S can be attacked from both directions. And 
what S claims about one rival might be turned against it 
by the other, In rejecting Neutralism, a Self Interest 
Theorist must claim that a reason may have force only 
for the agent. But the grounds for this claim support a 
further claim. If a reason can have force only for the 
agent, it can have a force for the agent only at the time of 
acting. The Self-interest Theorist must reject this claim. 
6
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He must attack the notion of a time-relative reason. But 
arguments to show that reasons must be temporally 
neutral, thus refuting the Present-aim theory, may also 
show that reasons must be neutral between different 
people, thus refuting the Self-interest Theory. (p. 140). 
Sidgwick disagrees with Parfit and argues that prudence in its 
hybrid character can indeed be defended as long as the 
separateness of persons is  recognized,  and  Humean’s  skepticism 
about personal identity over time is rejected (Brink, 2011). 
However, Brink (2011) questions if the compensation principle, 
as seen among intertemporal and interpersonal distribution, 
provides enough rationale to defend the hybrid theory of 
prudence;;   he   asks:   “could   not   doubts   about   interpersonal  
balancing be extended to intrapersonal balancing? If the 
separateness of persons defeats interpersonal balancing, why 
does  not   the   separateness  of  different  periods  within  a  person’s  
life defeat intrapersonal   balancing?”   (p.   364).   He   sees  
Sidgwick’s   argument   about   the   separateness   of   persons   as  
requiring temporal impartiality, in addition to temporal 
neutrality. The problem of compensation turns to the sub-
personal perspective, whose limit is a fully relative momentary 
time slice – a single segment of the person. And, in order to 
determine if compensation has occurred, the subject needs to be 
clearly determined. This becomes increasingly difficult when we 
talk about arbitrary person-segments;;   people’s   lives   constitute 
multitudes of past, present, and future segments, not only 
individual time slices, therefore, the subject cannot be an 
individual person-segment, but a person as a complete entity 
(Brink, 2011).  
              Lastly, Brink (2011) dispels the problem of 
conceptualizing   a   person   as   “all   there”   in   relation   to   the  
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subject/person being a complete entity; if person-segments 
extend   in   the  future,   they,  by  default,   are  not  “all   there,”  hence  
undermining the concept of an agent as a determinate subject. 
The present self-acts as a representative of the temporally 
dispersed entity, the subject, by acting in the interest of this 
being. Therefore, the fact that the temporally extended person is 
“not  all  there”  at  the  time  of  action,  is  not  a  reason  to  deny  that it 
is the subject whose interests determine what agents have reason 
to do. Under this hypothesis we, once again, have intrapersonal 
compensation; therefore compensation does justify temporal 
neutrality (Brink, 2011). 
Personal Identity and Temporal Neutrality 
              The rationale for temporal neutrality appears to rest on 
certain assumptions about personal identity. In the long tradition 
of thinking about personal identity in terms of psychological 
continuity and connectedness, Parfit (1984) argues that 
psychological reductionism has a potential to undermine 
prudence’s   demand   for   temporal   neutrality.   Psychological  
reductionism argues that two persons are psychologically 
connected insofar as the intentional states and actions of one 
influence the intentional states of the other; they are 
psychologically continuous insofar as they represent links in the 
chain or series of people in which contiguous links in the chain 
are psychologically well connected. Also, continuity and 
connectedness can be matters of degree (Brink 2011). Parfit 
further attacks temporal neutrality with the concept of discount 
rate of   connectedness,   arguing   that,   “since   connectedness   is  
nearly always weaker over long periods, I can rationally care less 
about   my   further   future”   (Parfit,   1984, p. 313). This becomes 
problematic since psychological reductionism does not justify 
duty or permissibility to discount; if the improvement involves 
8
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psychological change that diminishes connectedness, then there 
are less prudential reasons to undertake it.  
              However, provided that one plays a suitable role in 
generating and shaping the change in his or her beliefs, the 
change in character presents no obstacle to preservation of 
connectedness over time. Likewise, the argument about 
transitive relations – if A=B and B=C, then A=C –  qualifies 
personal identity, but not the psychological connectedness. In the 
case of continuity, as opposed to connectedness, if A is 
connected to B, and B is connected to C, then A and C will be 
continuous, even though they are not well connected. Regardless 
of this situation, Brink (2011) argues that diminished 
connectedness between A and C does not diminish the continuity 
between A and C; if reductionism is formulated in terms of 
continuity, rather than connectedness, then diminished 
connectedness over time does not justify a discount rate. Even in 
the case that connectedness actually matters, the reductionist 
case for discounting confounds parts and wholes. As long as it is 
the person who is the agent and whose interests are at stake, 
differences   in  connectedness   among   the  parts  of  a  person’s   life  
should   not,   as   such,   affect   the   person’s   reasons   to   have   equal  
regard for all part of the life. Brink (2011) ultimately concludes 
that such considerations undermine the reductionist case for 
discount rate, leaving rationale for temporal neutrality 
metaphysically robust. 
Intrapersonal Conflicts of Value 
              By elaborating intrapersonal conflicts of value, Brink 
(2011)   employs   Parfit’s  Russian Nobleman example – whether 
or not one should be expected to moderate the pursuit of ideals 
one holds dear in the present, for the sake of ideals one presently 
rejects but will accept in the future – to reiterate and defend 
9
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argumentation from the previous section on personal identity and 
temporal   neutrality;;   provided   one’s   present   ideals   are  
worthwhile, one can honor temporal neutrality by acting in 
accord   with   one’s   present   ideals   and   thereby   avoiding  
intertemporal conflict.  
              But what happens when one is faced with unavoidable 
intertemporal conflicts? The implications of temporal neutrality 
in situations involving unavoidable intrapersonal conflicts of 
ideals depend on the merits of the conflicting ideals; for the 
purpose of clarity, unavoidable conflicts are divided into two 
categories, symmetrical and asymmetrical. The asymmetrical 
conflicts are divided into cases of corruption – before’s ideals 
are valuable, whereas after’s are not –  and improvement – 
before’s ideals are worthless, whereas after’s ideals are valuable. 
In this case, the demands of temporal neutrality are clear – one 
should act on the worthwhile ideals when one has them, not the 
worthless  ones,  for  this  is  a  claim  about  one’s  objective  reasons.  
In the case of corruption, all one has to do is act on current ideals 
(Brink, 2011). However, the case of improvement delegates 
further inquiry in the light of the question: should one act on the 
worthless ideals one presently embraces, irrespective of the 
worthwhile ideals one will act upon in the future? In other 
words, can temporal neutrality make plausible claims about 
subjective rationality? Could it be subjectively rational to act on 
valuable ideals that one does not presently hold? Brink (2011) 
argues yes, provided that we understand subjective reasons as the 
reasons one has, not in virtue of what one now judges, but in 
virtue of what it would be reasonable for one to judge now if one 
gave the matter due attention.  
              In the case of conflicts with symmetrical merits, there 
are also multiple categories. There is a minus-minus situation 
10
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where conflicting ideals are similarly worthless and a plus-plus 
situation where the conflicting ideals are both equally valuable. 
In the minus-minus case, neutrality argument delegates that 
neither  ideals be embraced, favoring an alternative third ideal 
that might have merit. Conversely, in the plus-plus case, 
temporal neutrality recognizes a conflict of objective reasons – 
after’s ideals conflict with before’s ideals regardless of what the 
agent does now – among two valuable ideals and suggests a sort 
of neutrality among them. Brink (2011) proposes that in case of 
such a genuine dilemma, where one has to choose temporally 
among valuable ideals, neutrality accommodates two possible 
scenarios; first, one might achieve less-than-substantial success 
along both ideals – neither a stellar success nor an abject failure 
at any time; second, one might engage in the unreserved and 
successful pursuit of ideals either now, or later, however, not 
both, provided that the process of selecting the favored ideal 
gave equal chances of success to both ideals. Provided that 
merits of the conflicting ideals are not transcendent facts, these 
claims   about   the   agent’s   objective   reasons   apply   to   subjective  
reasons as well. Since neither of these options is ideal, Brink 
(2011) offers prospective consolation by reasoning infrequency 
of such genuine dilemmas.    
The Symmetry Argument 
              Unlike the previous arguments about temporal 
neutrality, some of the symmetry arguments brought by the 
Epicureans – arguments that claim philosophy should be 
confrontational and involve the removal of the fear of death, 
since it tends to cause anxiety – are concentrated on the concept 
of nonexistence. Roman poet and philosopher Lucretius 
recognizes asymmetry in our attitudes towards past and future as 
11
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irrational, and in his De Rerum Natura, invokes symmetry 
between postmortem and prenatal nonexistence as follows: 
1. Death brings nonexistence. 
2. Postmortem nonexistence is no different than 
prenatal nonexistence. 
3. We do not regret our prenatal nonexistence. 
4. Hence, we should not regret our death.  
But Brink (2011) points out that appeals to symmetry are 
problematic since the parity of prenatal and postmortem 
nonexistence can be exploited to expand and contract regret. He 
exemplifies it in the following symmetry argument:  
1. Death brings nonexistence. 
2. Postmortem nonexistence is no different than 
prenatal nonexistence. 
3. We do regret our death. 
4. Hence, we should regret our prenatal nonexistence. 
(p. 375). 
The Epicurean symmetry argument appeals to the existence 
requirement, which delegates that one cannot be harmed if one 
does not exist, but it does not explain why death is not bad. One 
can indeed be harmed by death, since death deprives one of the 
goods one would have enjoyed had one continued to exist; if this 
is what is bad about death, then symmetry suggests that we do 
have a reason to regret our prenatal existence (Brink, 2011). In 
defense of the second symmetry argument, Brink (2011) invokes 
a metaphysical thesis about the essentiality of origin:   “for  
something to harm me it must make me worse off than I would 
otherwise have been, although this does not establish the 
essentiality   of   time   of   birth”   (p.   375-376). However, the 
argument stipulates that even if one assumed  that  one’s  time  of  
birth was essential to one, it still would not follow that one could 
12
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not   sensibly   regret   one’s  prenatal   nonexistence.  Lastly,   being   a  
coherent and legitimate object of regret does not make it 
appropriate for one to be preoccupied with the possibility of 
one’s  prenatal  nonexistence,   any  more   than   it   follows   from   the  
fact   that   one’s   death   is   a   legitimate   object   of   regret   that   one  
should be preoccupied with. While Epicureans most likely would 
not welcome the reasoning surrounding the second symmetry 
argument, the argument takes seriously and defends their appeal 
to temporal neutrality (Brink 2011).      
Minimizing Future Suffering 
              Discussions and attitudes about pain, grief, and 
suffering are commonly favored within past temporal settings, 
unlike those of happiness, comfort, and wellbeing that permeate 
conversations with future temporal locales. This seems to be true 
even in cases where this choice includes more total pain 
(Callender,   2011).   Brink   (2011)   explains   Parfit’s   “painful 
operation”  scenario  that  addresses  a  “more  total  pain”  instance  as  
irrationally biased and temporally relative:  
There   is   a   painful   operation   that   requires   patient’s  
cooperation, and must be performed without the use of 
anesthetic. But doctors can and do induce (selective) 
amnesia after the operation to block memories of these 
painful experiences, which are themselves painful. One 
knows that one is scheduled for this procedure. One 
wakes up in the hospital bed and asks the nurse whether 
one have had the procedure yet. One knows that he or 
she is one of two patients, but does not know which. 
Either one is patient A, who had the longest operation on 
record yesterday, or one is patient B, who is due for a 
significantly shorter procedure. While one waits for the 
nurse to check the records, one finds having a strong 
13
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preference and hope that one is patient A, even though 
A’s  pain   and   suffering  was  greater   than  B’s  will   be   (p.  
377).    
Brink   (2011)   argues   that   patient   A’s   reasoning   might   not   be  
entirely rational; if both procedures are viewed prospectively and 
retrospectively, there is a temporally neutral preference to 
minimize suffering; it is only when greater suffering is in the 
past and the smaller suffering is in the future that one displays 
temporally biased preference for greater past pain. However, the 
preference for either procedure appears unstable at best.  
              In support of this reasoning, Brink (2011) recalls 
Socrates’  discussions  about  the  weakness  of  will  (akrasia)  in  the  
Protagoras; Socrates suggests that our judgments about what is 
best are inappropriately influenced by the proximity of harms 
and benefits, which leads to inflated estimates of their 
magnitude. It is in these instances that temporal bias is 
exemplified, leading to the agent’s  irrational  decisions.  The  fact  
that a brief hot judgment (defined by the immediate proximity of 
indulgences) is preceded and followed by the prospective and 
retrospective cool judgment (defined   by   agent’s   decision   to  
forsake short-term indulgences for the sake of later long-term 
ones), is the evidence that the hot judgment cannot be trusted. 
Socrates classifies this instance as irrational, as opposed to 
akratic. The bias in favor of minimizing future suffering appears 
anomalous against the background of prospective and 
retrospective cool judgments that are temporally neutral (Brink 
2011).  
              The irrationality of temporal bias is further exemplified 
through the lack of generalization. As much as past pain is 
preferred over future pain, even in the case of more total pain, 
this is often untrue of disgraces (Brink, 2011). One is likely to 
14
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prefer smaller future disgraces to larger past ones, thus indicating 
non-generalizability of the preference, as in the medical 
procedure example. Further, the preference seems to hold only 
for   one’s   own   pains,   while   the   pain   of   others   seems   to   be  
temporally neutral (Parfit, 1984). In conclusion, Brink (2011) 
argues that, from the evolutionary perspective, a forward-looking 
bias that prioritizes the minimization of future pain, as it relates 
to   one’s   fitness   in   a   way   that   past   pain   could   not,   might   help  
explain why one might be subject to this bias even when it is not 
rational. However, any divulged bias has inherent 
generalizability and instability issues, making arguments about 
temporal neutrality relevant and indelible.  
Conclusion 
              David   O.   Brink’s   Prospects for Temporal Neutrality 
was written as an introductory chapter to The Oxford Handbook 
of   Philosophy   of   Time’s Time, Ethics and Experience section, 
and is 1 of the 23 chapters that comprehensively cover topics in 
the philosophy of time. 
              The chapter examined issues surrounding intertemporal 
distribution  of  benefits  and  harms  within  a  single  life.  Prudence’s  
demand of temporal neutrality as a norm of intrapersonal 
distribution was the main focus of the chapter. Brink (2011) 
argued  that  prudence’s  demand  of  temporal  neutrality  assigns  no  
normative significance per se to the temporal locations of 
benefits   and   harms   within   a   person’s   life, and demands equal 
concern for all parts of that life. The primary rationale of 
temporal neutrality appears to be the principle of compensation; 
it provides a hybrid structure of prudence by being temporally 
neutral and agent-biased, and by appealing to assumptions about 
the separateness of persons. However, controversial aspects of 
temporal neutrality still remain, especially within cases of 
15
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interpersonal conflicts of values and ideals. The Epicurean 
arguments about the symmetry between death and prenatal 
nonexistence also appeared relatively defensible. Finally, 
temporal  neutrality’s  rejection  of  preferences  for  past  over  future  
pain, even when this entails preferences of more total pain, 
appear unstable and non-generalizable due to bias  (Brink 2011). 
Brinks’  concluding  suggestion  calls  for  a  systematic  comparative  
assessment of temporal neutrality, acknowledging that as it 
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